Understanding the Barotseland Question..........What Youths Need to Learn.

By Sishuwa Sishuwa
ONE of the most interminable, touchy and persistent challenges that has troubled successive Zambian governments has been the Barotseland question. The Barotseland question has invoked deep nationalist sentiments in some Zambians who have viewed those talking of a Barotse (or Bulozi) nation as unpatriotic citizens who deserve to be locked up for treason. For others, especially those located in the state or close to the government of the day, demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement have been interpreted as the work of a few misguided people who want to bring about anarchy and disunity to our constitutional order based on a unitary state.

The political temperature in Barotseland reached scorching levels on January 14 2011 when demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 led by the Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM), Linyungandambo, Movement for Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement (MOREMA) and the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) (all unregistered or illegal organizations) led to a peaceful rally in Mongu that was brutally suppressed by security forces of the Rupiah Banda administration, resulting in the death of two people and the imprisonment of several others. The violent manner in which the government cracked down on the protesters was unprecedented.

As part of his campaign message, then opposition PF leader and now President Michael Sata promised to resolve the Barotseland question if elected. True to his word, President Sata has begun addressing the Barotse challenge. Recently, the government made available and publicised the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 as a starting point for discussions. It is the first time this has been done by any sitting government. Previous successive governments, most notably the Banda administration, not only criminalised debate over the Barotseland issue but also treated the Agreement as a top, classified document to be kept away from the public eye. President Sata latest stance demonstrates the current government's preparedness to depart from that incorrect historical path, confront the challenge head-on and find a lasting and amicable political solution to the Barotseland question as any delay may have far-reaching repercussions on the territorial integrity of the country we call Zambia.

Dialogue should be based on knowledge and such an approach enables both parties to come to the negotiating table with informed perspectives. But what really is the Barotseland Agreement? How was it abrogated? And how can the protracted standoff over the Barotseland Agreement question best be resolved? A reader of the column recently shared their take on this issue and I reproduce the writer's opinion, which I share, with very minor alterations, below.

What is the Barotseland Agreement?
The good citizen writes: "Barotseland is not a fiction or an imaginary political community, inconsistent with the modern state of Zambia. Barotseland has a legal and special status in Zambian political history. It enjoyed the status of a Protectorate during British colonial rule in its own right and as part of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. In various colonial treaties and Orders in Council Barotseland was acknowledged as a separate nation-state. Specifically, the Moncton Commission of 1960 reaffirmed the special status of Barotseland within Northern Rhodesia. Section 57 and 80 of the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1962 and section 59 and 112 of the Self-Governing Constitution of Northern Rhodesia of 1963 affirmed Barotseland as a separate state within Northern Rhodesia.

It was ‘a protectorate within a protectorate.' To be sure, the Zambia Independence Act and the Zambia Independence Order of 1964 gave recognition to the Barotseland Agreement of 1964.
Prior to Zambia's independence the position of Barotseland had to be considered. As a protectorate of the British Crown, Barotseland had an option to be part of an independent Zambia or to remain a British Protectorate and seek its own independence separately. Barotseland at the time had status similar to the British High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutholand and Swaziland (present-day Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland).

The people of Barotseland chose to be part of an independent unitary Zambia on condition that they retained some degree of autonomy and were in charge of local government affairs based on their traditional and customary law as they had done for generations. It was agreed at the London Conference held on 16 April 1964 that the Litunga of Barotseland will continue to have power to make laws for Barotseland in relation to local government, native treasury, local taxation, native authorities, traditional and customary matters, native courts, land and natural resources, game conservation and local festivals, among others.

Thus the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 signed by first President Kenneth Kaunda on behalf of the Northern Rhodesia Government, the Litunga of Barotseland Sir Mwanawina Lewanika III on behalf of the people of Barotseland and Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth and Colonial Relations and representing Her Majesty's Government as a witness to the settlement, did not create a separate state of Barotseland but rather reaffirmed its semi-autonomous status in a unitary state of Zambia.

The abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement
In 1965 the independent government of Zambia unilaterally abrogated terms of the Barotseland Agreement by introducing the Local Government Act 1965 which effectively abolished the Barotse Government, Barotse Native Authorities, the Barotse Native Courts and the Barotse Native Treasury and Barotseland was to be administered through a uniform local government system applied throughout the country. The Chiefs Act was introduced the same year and it permitted the President of Zambia to recognise or withdraw recognition from any Chief in the country at will, in the interest of national unity and order, leading to widespread suspicions in Barotseland that the Act was targeted at the Litunga.

In 1969, the Government organised a national referendum to determine if the Barotseland Agreement should be removed from the constitution or terminated. The people of Western Province overwhelmingly voted ‘No' in the Referendum but the rest of the other Provinces voted Yes. Barotseans argued that it was wrong for the Government to extend the referendum to the whole country on a matter that concerned them, adding that the referendum should have just been restricted to the affected Province. In the aftermath of the referendum, the Government took to Parliament the Constitutional Amendment Act of 1969, which effectively terminated the Barotseland Agreement of 1964. The same year, the Government renamed Barotseland as Western Province and declared that all provinces were to be treated the same.

The rights reserved for the Litunga and his Council and the people of Barotseland were tampered with as they no longer had the institutions to exercise local self-government. This was interpreted in Barotseland as another attempt to further undermine the semi-autonomous status of Barotseland and vest all land in the President of the Republic of Zambia. Agitation and resentment over government actions regarding the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement are not new. They were voiced in 1968, 1969 and 1970 with some Lozi traditionalists led by Litunga Mbikusita Lewanika demanding restoration of the provisions of the Agreement or they would seek secession. In 1993, under the Frederick Chiluba Government demands were again made for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement.

But the authorities at the time dismissed the demands and even threatened to arrest and detain all those involved, including Litunga Ilute Yeta for high treason. President Chiluba declared then that Zambia was a unitary state and as such indivisible, therefore no part of it would be allowed to break away. The recent demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 led by BFM, Linyungandambo, MOREMA and the BPF should thus be understood in their right context.
They are just a continuation of the work of other similar organisations that suffered government reprisals and harassment. For example, the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) was banned and its leader placed in detention for advocating secession in the late 1990s. What is different about the new formations is that they are much more radical and demand immediate resolution of the impasse.

The motive force that led to the current demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement was the apparent refusal by the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) to incorporate submissions by the Barotse Royal Establishment to recognize the status of Barotseland in the new Constitution and implement the provisions the Barotseland Agreement 1964. The submissions by the Barotse Royal Establishment to the NCC in 2010 were dismissed outright as lacking merit in a unitary state. It was this which provoked anger by sections of the Barotse ‘nation' that there is need to engage in dialogue on the Barotseland Agreement as it was an important part of the first independence constitution.

Since this agitation began there have been a lot of commentaries from different sections of our community on the merits and demerits of restoring the Barotseland Agreement. One group of people dismiss the demand as tribal, parochial and going against the tenets of a unitary state and the national motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation.' Another group accuses those who advocate the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement as secessionists, anarchists who should be arrested, charged with treason and possibly hanged. While others, have simply trivialized the demands as unworkable, as Barotseland cannot survive without Zambia, ‘since it is just a sandy place.'

There are those who feel that advocates of the Barotseland Agreement want a separate state which will incorporate all the areas which originally fell under Litunga's dominion in pre-colonial times."
So, good citizen, ‘what should be the way forward?', I put it to my intelligent friend.

Resolving the Barotseland Question

WE continue with last week's interrogation of the Barotseland question. What then should be the way forward? First, demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement cannot be said to be tantamount to secession. To the best of my knowledge the Barotseland Agreement 1964 was never repealed nor revoked. The point is that the central authorities in Lusaka unilaterally abrogated the terms of a legal document that was part of the Zambian constitution. The Government of the Republic of Zambia has an obligation to explain what happened to the Barotseland Agreement 1964.

Why were those terms abrogated? Who was consulted when those changes were being made and to what extent was there consensus on the matter? There is no doubt that if there was consultation and consensus regarding changes to the Barotseland Agreement 1964 and the status of Barotseland post-independence, there would not be demands for its restoration today.

Second, it is most irresponsible for national level politicians to dismiss the demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 as the work of young, misguided individuals who want to bring about disunity and anarchy in the country. While the methods being used by the advocates of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 may not be acceptable to everyone, it is important to recognize that they are raising legitimate demands that need to be addressed by the Government of the Republic of Zambia. The hardening of positions in Lusaka, the criminalization of debate and the demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement will only drive the resistance underground and escalate into a fully-fledged armed conflict.

Indeed, what successive Governments have found unacceptable is the demand for secession by the advocates of the Barotseland Agreement on account that the Government has not only unilaterally abrogated its provisions, but has consistently refused to listen to any voices on this matter and lately ensured that there is no mention of Barotseland in the new Constitution of Zambia. The events of January 14, 2011 where security forces brutally suppressed the holding of a peaceful public rally on the Barotseland Agreement question resulting in the death of two people and injuries of several others were not only unfortunate but were avoidable.

Third, it is important to interrogate how widespread the demands for secession are in Barotseland. It would be politically naïve to assume that simply because there are few people who are making the demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement, there is no consensus on the issue in the province. It would also be politically costly for the Government to use brute force in suppressing the demands as that will only radicalize the conflict. The starting point should be to recognize that the people of Barotseland have a legitimate right to make the demands for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement, including the right to secede from Zambia. However, this should be done through democratic channels.

Fourth, the government of the Republic of Zambia should not misrepresent history and misinform the Zambian people about the true status of Barotseland. Reading the many commentaries that have appeared in our media in recent months, an impression created is that those making demands for an independent Barotse nation are mad, misguided and bent on creating disunity in this peaceful country of Zambia. Senior government politicians have been quoted as saying that what the advocates of the Barotseland Agreement are demanding is no tenable and in any case there is no way Barotseland can be treated differently from other parts of the country. This is a distortion of historical facts.

Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia proceeded to independence based on a legal agreement. That legal agreement termed the Barotseland Agreement was the product of negotiated settlement between the people of Barotseland, Northern Rhodesia and the British Government. The terms of that Agreement are therefore important for the sustainability of the union between Barotseland and Zambia. It was envisaged in the Barotseland Agreement 1964 that in case of disputes the Courts of Zambia would adjudicate between the parties.

Fifth, the demands by the people of Barotseland for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement or to secede from Zambia are not an isolated case in international law.
Although no country in the world provides for a state's right to secede in its national constitution except Ethiopia, there are many similar cases where nations came together and when the purpose for which they came together were no longer in force they sought to break away. Yugoslavia was brought together as an amalgamation of several small states dominated by Serbia. The Soviet Union was also a federation of several states. When the purpose for which the coming together was no longer justified they broke up, sometimes after prolonged military conflict.

Kosovo which has been dominated by Serbia as its autonomous province is perhaps the best example that can be compared to Barotseland in Zambia. No amount of resistance from Serbia was enough to prevent the unilateral independence by Kosovo in 2009. Other examples include South Sudan and Quebec, Canada's second most populous and economically influential province, after Ontario. South Sudan recently declared its independence from mainland Sudan after a democratic referendum was held. After several years of demands for secession from mainland Canada, which included two unsuccessful referendums for independence in 1980 and 1995, the Canadian House of Commons finally passed a historic motion in 2006 that recognises Quebec as a nation within a united Canada. However, there are alternative options that the Government of Zambia can pursue that do not border on secession. These include recognising the fact that Zambia, like the United Republic of Tanzania, is a unitary state and that national heritage should be reflected in the constitution.

Valuable lessons can be drawn, for example, on how Tanzania and Zanzibar, whose union was also promulgated in 1964, have managed to hold on, promote national unity and avoid the path that our own union has taken. However, there has to be willingness on the part of the Government of Zambia to take responsibility and face this question head-on, inspired by two obvious questions: ‘what is the problem?', and ‘how can that problem best be resolved in a manner that enhances national unity and puts this matter to rest?' Furthermore and in order to avoid any potential mix-up, misinterpretation and strife, the reported plans by the Government of Zambia to relocate certain districts from Western to other Provinces should be shelved until the Barotseland question is amicably resolved.

National politicians and party leaders should exercise their minds over the Barotseland question. The question requires a political solution and it is imperative to engage in dialogue with all the protagonists over the issue. Surely, 47 years after independence perceptions about Lozi nationalism have slightly changed. Even perceptions about the Lozi monarchy has fundamentally changed and notions of modern democratic norms are now prevalent in the minds of most inhabitants of Barotseland. However, it is up to the people of that area to democratically choose what form of government they desire, including to continue being part of Zambia or to secede. Nationalist sentiments can be very strong and pose potent mobilizing forces against perceived dominant and exploitative forces.

To be sure there are three positions on the Barotseland question: to remain as part of a unitary state of Zambia, to restore Barotseland Agreement so as to ensure more regional autonomy, albeit in a traditional authority sense, or to completely secede. These positions are not mutually exclusive. They are intertwined and have wider implications on the relationship between modern and traditional jurisprudence. To allow more autonomy to Barotseland undermines the political authority of the Zambian state and may encourage other regions to make similar demands. For example, the Barotseland Agreement provides for institutions such as a Barotse National Government, Barotse National Council (parliament), Barotse Native Courts and Barotse Native Treasury all sovereign institutions that will have implications on the sovereignty of Zambia and its unitary constitution. The question is why did the central government at the time not deal with these issues in a more transparent and democratic way, than hope that somehow they will die away with the passage of time?

The other curious irony is that Barotseland throughout colonial history was administered as part of Northern Rhodesia. The 1911 Order in Council that amalgamated North-Eastern Rhodesia with North-Western Rhodesia to create the colonial state of Northern Rhodesia conferred protectorate status to both Northern Rhodesia and to Barotseland, and yet Barotseland was administered as part of Northern Rhodesia. A poor resolution of the crisis in Barotseland has serious political implications for the Zambian state, Zambian politics and the viability of national unity. What is needed is a democratic resolution of the Barotseland Question that should involve the following: convening of a conference on the Barotseland Question in Barotseland to assess the state of the debate and to narrow the areas of contention; organizing a national referendum within Barotseland to ascertain whether the people would want to secede or remain part of a unitary Zambia; recognition of all political forces and civil society organisations that are engaged in the Barotseland issue and promotion of a mature debate about the Barotseland issue to avoid it escalating into regionalism, xenophobia and victimization of individuals and groups from that region.